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Abstract: We develop a classical macroeconomic model to examine the growth and dis-
tributional consequences of education. Contrary to the received wisdom, we show that human
capital accumulation is not necessarily growth-inducing and inequality-reducing. Expansive
education policies may foster growth and reduce earning inequalities between workers, but
only by transferring income from workers to capitalists. Further, the overall effect of an
increase in education depends on the actual characteristics of the educational system and on
the nature of labor market relations. Although the primary aim of the paper is theoretical,
we argue that the model identifies some causal mechanisms that can contribute to shed light
on recent stylized facts on growth, distribution and education for the US.
JEL codes: O41, I24, E25
Keywords: education, growth, distribution
2
1 Introduction
The role of education – and what is called human capital – has received a great deal of atten-
tion in the literature on economic growth in recent decades. The contribution of education
to skill formation, and the resultant division of the labor force into high- and low-skilled
workers (henceforth, H- and L-workers, respectively), has also been widely examined in the
literatures on income distribution and international trade. This analysis has been conducted
empirically and theoretically, and also entered popular discussions. Neoclassical growth mod-
els (including endogenous growth models) see education as promoting growth by making the
productivity of labor increase more rapidly, and improving income distribution by increasing
wages, although different rates of skill formation – through education – between different
groups are sometimes argued to exacerbate income inequality. Surprisingly, however, educa-
tion has received little or no attention in theories of growth and distribution in the classical
tradition, despite the obvious relevance it has for the dynamics of capitalist economies. A
recent text on growth theory written mainly from a classical perspective, by Foley and Michl
(1999) has no discussion of the role of education. We are, in fact, unaware of any heterodox
dynamic model of growth and distribution which analyzes the role of education.1
This gap is all the more surprising given the fair amount of attention devoted to education
in broader political economy discussions. While much of this discussion is in relation to
the ideological role of education, some of it also relates to growth. For instance, some
commentators have associated the relative neglect of the education sector with the profit
squeeze and the decline in productivity growth after the so-called Golden Age of Capitalism
1To the best of our knowledge, the only exceptions are a post-Keynesian model in Dutt (2010) and our
earlier paper on classical growth theory which contains a simplified model but focuses on the contributions
of the classical economists on education (Dutt and Veneziani 2011).
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which ended in the late 1960s (Glyn et. al. 1990).
The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature and develop a classical model
of growth and distribution in which the primary role of education is to convert L-workers into
H-workers, and with which broader political-economy considerations may also be addressed.
The classical approach to growth has thus far focused mainly on the role of capital
accumulation due to saving by capitalists (see Foley and Michl 1999, for an exposition), and
due to technological change brought about by the response of capitalist firms to labor market
conditions (see, e.g., Duménil and Lévy 2003; Flaschel 2009).2 It is not obvious what effect
education would have on growth and distribution according to this tradition. Given the
existence of unemployed workers, increases in education, by increasing labor productivity,
need not increase output and its growth. Nor, in the presence of unemployment, do they
necessarily increase wages and improve income distribution.3 Indeed, the classical framework
has not been concerned with the effect of education and skill formation on distribution,
focusing instead on the functional distribution of income between wages and profits,4 with
some attention being given to landlords, rent and natural resources in a Ricardian vein (as in
Pasinetti’s 1960 classic model or, more recently, in Foley and Michl 1999; and Petith 2008),
to managers (Tavani and Vasudevan 2014),5 and to financial capitalists – following Marx’s
2There are, of course, many differences regarding the analysis of growth and distribution of those who
have collectively been referred to as classical economists, such as Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, Mill and Marx, and
there are also different interpretations of each classical economist. We do not discuss these exegetical issues
but, rather, use a model that captures some essential characteristics common to the classical economists.
3Marx, for instance, argued that education would not have a positive effect on wages when the educated
labor became unemployed due to the introduction of machinery because the skilled unemployed would bid
down wages competing for the remaining jobs (Marx and Engels 1975-2005, Vol. VI, p. 427).
4See, for example, the classic analyses by Goodwin (1967) and Foley (1986). More recent contributions
include Flaschel (2009).
5The conception and role of managerial labor is quite different from our notion of H-workers. For
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distinction between interest payments and profit income (Dutt 1989). How will education
and human capital affect the dynamics of distribution? Will limited access to education
widen the inequality between people who obtain higher levels of education and those who
do not? What are the broader, political-economy effects of education?
The main purpose of our exercise is theoretical and the paper attempts to fill a gap in the
literature on classical models. Yet our motivation is not purely theoretical or exegetical. We
believe that models in the classical tradition may contribute to explain some stylized facts
of the dynamics of growth and distribution in advanced economies, which are at least prima
facie inconsistent with the standard approach. In particular, although our analysis does not
aim to provide a complete explanation of the recent dynamics of growth and inequality in
the US economy, the complete model in section 5 does shed some light on important causal
mechanisms that provide a counterpoint to the standard emphasis on the beneficial effects
of education and human capital accumulation.
1.1 Stylized facts
To be specific, our analysis is motivated by some features of the US economy in the past
four decades, which have been characterized by the rise of the knowledge economy and the
predominance of neoliberal policies.
Consider distribution first: the income shares of capital and labor have remained roughly
constant from 1975 to 2011, with the share of wages in national income averaging 0.64
with a standard deviation of 0.011 and the share of corporate business profits before tax
averaging 0.076 with a standard deviation of 0.02 (Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal
Reserve Bank of St Louis). At the same time, earning inequalities within the labor force
managers perform purely supervisory work and their prerogatives are not linked to skills or education.
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have significantly increased: the ratio of the hourly wage of College-educated workers to the
hourly wage of workers with just a high school degree has moved from around 1.43 in the
mid-1970s to 1.76 in 2007 (The State of Working America 2008-10, Table 3.15). Similarly,
the income share of the top decile of the income distribution has moved from around 32% in
the mid-1970s to 46% in 2010, with most of the gains actually accruing to the top 1% (The
State of Working America 12th Edition, Figure 2AA).
Concerning growth, two features of the dynamics of the US economy stand out. The
growth rate in per capita GDP has averaged 1.78% during 1975-2013 (World Development
Indicators, World Bank). This is much lower than the average growth rate in the previous
years characterized by the so-called Keynesian compromise. Also, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, despite significant fluctuations, there is no sign of an acceleration in growth in the
last four decades. If anything, the growth rate displays a slightly declining trend.
Trends in education are equally clear, showing an increasingly educated workforce, and
a seemingly more open education system that is more accessible, for example, to women
and minorities. Total fall enrolment in higher education has seen a continuous and marked
upward trend from 11.1 million in 1975 to 21 million in 2010, with an acceleration since
1990. At the same time, the percentage of women enrolled saw a remarkable increase from
46% in 1975 to 57% in 2010.6 Similarly, the percentage of high school completers going
to College has increased significantly across the whole population but particularly marked
upward trends can be seen in the black and hispanic populations with both groups moving
6Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Opening Fall Enroll-
ment in Higher Education, 1965; Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS), “Fall Enrollment
in Institutions of Higher Education” surveys, 1966 through 1985; Integrated Postsecondary Education Data
System (IPEDS), “Fall Enrollment Survey” (IPEDS-EF:86-99); and IPEDS Spring 2001 through Spring
2011, Enrollment component.
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from around 45% in 1972 to, respectively, 69.5% and 59.3% in 2009.
The developments in education in the last four decades seem at odds with the stylized
facts on growth and inequality. Based on endogenous growth theory, a significant increase in
human capital should lead to a higher growth rate of the economy, ceteris paribus. Similarly,
the increase in the supply of H-labor, and a wider access to education, should reduce skill
differentials and have equalizing effects, ceteris paribus. The standard way to reconcile these
stylized facts is precisely to deny the empirical relevance of the ceteris paribus clause. In
particular, the marked increase in earning inequalities is explained by skill-biased technical
change which has led the demand for educated workers to increase even more sharply than
supply, thereby raising the skill differential.7
This is not the place for a thorough discussion of the vast literature on earning inequali-
ties, but it is worth noting that the empirical evidence on the skill-biased technical change
hypothesis is inconclusive. Standard human capital variables such as experience and educa-
tion usually explain between one eighth and one third of earning inequalities, and a large
part of earning inequalities occur within groups of equally educated and experienced work-
ers – even controlling for other observable individual characteristics (see Card and Lemieux
1996; Lemieux 2006). To be sure, one may argue that these results are due to data limi-
tations, and any residual variance in earning inequality can be attributed to unobservable
individual skills. Yet Egger and Grossman (2004) have shown that cognitive skills remain of
limited value to explain the variance of wage differentials among workers with the same level
7“In the absence of substantial skill bias in technology, the large increase in the supply of skilled workers
would have depressed the skill premium” (Acemoglu 2002b, p.10). Skill-biased technical change could be
either exogenous (Katz and Murphy 1992; Autor et al. 1998), or endogenously generated by the increase in
the relative supply of H-labor, as in the so-called ‘market size effect’ (Acemoglu 2002a, 2002b).
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of education.8 More generally, there is growing empirical evidence suggesting that supply-
and-demand factors alone cannot explain observed variations in wage inequality in advanced
economies, and institutions, government policies, and the distribution of power among key
actors in the labor market have a central explanatory role (e.g. Blau and Kahn 1996 and
the contributions in Freeman and Katz 1996).9
From this perspective, given the presence of significant imperfections in both product and
labor markets, one important question concerns the factors influencing wage setting proce-
dures and institutions, including collective organizations, bargaining power, social norms,
expectations, and so on. In particular, in a general bargaining-theoretic framework, one
striking – and well-known – empirical fact is the marked decline in all indicators of workers’
bargaining power and cohesion. Union density remained reasonably stable during 1947-1979
with an average of 24.45% (and a standard deviation of 0.02) but has since steadily declined
reaching a minimum of 11.30% in 2003. The drop has been even more marked in the private
non-agricultural sector where unions have virtually disappeared and the percentage of work-
ers covered by a collective agreement has moved from 23.6% in 1979 to 7.4% in 2012 (Hirsch
and Macpherson 2003 and updates). A large number of empirical studies have proved that
unionization is one of the key variables in explaining income and earning distributions.
Therefore, although directed technical change is a key determinant of the dynamics of
growth and distribution, and competitive mechanisms and optimal choices play a funda-
8Focusing on a very detailed dataset collected by the OECD, Franzini and Raitano (2014) have proved
that wage differentials remain largely unexplained even including individual information about the details
of educational paths, employment history, and other acquired skills (e.g. knowledge of IT).
9Empirical studies in different countries indicate that the rapid increase in educational levels in the labor
force may have actually been faster than the educational requirements of jobs, leading to tendencies toward
overqualification among those employed (Borghans and de Grip 2000).
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mental role in determining skill differentials, we explore the connections between education,
growth and distribution in a classical model where institutions, bargaining, and social norms
are equally important.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical founda-
tions of our classical model of education, growth and distribution. Section 3 lays out the
benchmark model. Section 4 examines the dynamics of the economy with given bargaining
conditions. Section 5 generalizes the analysis of the growth and distributive implications of
education to economies in which the workers’ bargaining power is endogenously determined.
Section 6 relates our model and results to the stylized facts. Section 7 concludes.
2 Education in a classical framework
This section discusses how this paper incorporates education in a classical framework, by
considering three key questions: how is a classical economy characterized? What exactly is
the role of education in the economy? What determines changes in the level of education?
We examine each question in order to justify our modelling strategy.
2.1 Characteristics of the economy
We characterize the classical economy as having five key features. First, there is limited
substitution between capital and labor, the two basic factors of production, so that we can
simplify by assuming fixed coefficients for labor and capital in production.10 In addition to
10For many classical models this is not a crucial assumption because distribution is assumed to be exoge-
nously fixed (see below) and so profit-maximizing behavior generally implies a particular chosen technique
even with capital-labor substitution. When one allows changes in distribution, however, inelastic factor
substitution plays a more important role.
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capturing some key tenets of the classical tradition, this assumption is in line with recent
empirical evidence casting doubts on the substitutability between labor and capital, and on
marginal productivity theory as an explanation of the distribution of income between capital
and labor (Foley and Michl 1999; Basu 2009).
Second, there are two basic classes, capitalists and workers, with capitalists owning capital
and receiving income only from profits, and workers receiving income as wage labor only.
Third, capitalists save and workers do not. The assumption that workers do not save is,
of course, a simplification (the key hypothesis is actually that they save at a lower rate than
capitalists). Following Kaldor (1966), one may argue that differential saving rates are rooted
in the structure of a corporate economy: the saving rate out of profits is high because firms
retain a fraction of their profits.
But our assumption can also be seen as a stark way of capturing the extreme inequalities
in wealth distribution, and the relatively low degree of social mobility, that characterize
capitalist economies.11 Although both in our model and in actual economies, there are
relevant cleavages, and earning inequalities, within the working class, we think that our
assumption reflects – at least as a first approximation – the fact that the vast majority of
wage laborers have zero net wealth (Allegretto 2011; Piketty 2014; Krueger et al 2016).12 It
11To be sure, the degree of social mobility in advanced economies is not zero. Nonetheless, recent research
suggests that it is remarkably (and perhaps surprisingly) low and declining (Greenstone et al 2013). This
is true even if one considers the very long run (Barone and Mocetti 2016) and without major differences
between European countries and the US (Bénabou and Tirole 2006, pp.702ff). For a formal analysis of
income inequality and mobility in economies with heterogeneous skills, see for example Garc̀ıa-Peñalosa and
Turnovsky (2015) and Alonso-Carrera et al (in press).
12It is perhaps worth stressing again that H-workers in our model are neither managers, nor supervisors.
They are workers employed either in actual productive activities or in the education sector.
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is also in line with recent findings by Krueger et al (2016) who report higher consumption
rates for agents with lower net worth.
The main reason to rule out workers’ savings is, however, theoretical: we abstract from
saving by workers in order to abstract from the dynamics of worker-owned capital (Foley and
Michl 1999; Dutt and Veneziani in press) and focus on the effect of education in a starkly
class-divided economy. We shall return to this issue in the concluding section.
Fourth, the economy has unemployed workers, and the distribution of income is affected
by the relative bargaining power between capitalist firms and workers.
Finally, all savings are invested. This implies that the economy has no aggregate demand
problems, because there is investment demand from the entire income that is not consumed.
While this is an appropriate assumption for Smith and Ricardo, who both assumed versions
of Say’s Law, it is not faithful to either Malthus, who emphasized the problems of over-
saving and gluts, or Marx, who clearly recognized that capitalist producers can hoard rather
than invest if they have low profit expectations, and this can result in what Marx called
a realization problem and reduce output. However, Marx seems not to have stressed these
problems in analyzing long-run growth. Without taking a view on such exegetical issues,
we ignore effective demand problems and assume that all savings is automatically invested
consistently with almost all growth models in the classical-Marxian tradition.13
The assumptions on savings behavior and on effective demand imply that an increase in
the share of income going to profits has a positive effect on the growth rate of the economy.
13See, e.g., Harris (1978), Marglin (1984), Dutt (1990) and Foley and Michl (1999). Even when aggregate
demand is allowed to determine output in the short run, as in Duménil and Lévy (1999), in the long run the
economy is assumed to produce at the potential level of output with saving equal to investment. Dutt (2011)
provides a thorough discussion of the role of aggregate demand in the writings of the classical economists
and modern classical-Marxian growth theory.
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Although disputes on whether advanced economies are indeed profit-led (rather than wage-
led) are far from settled, there is a fair amount of evidence suggesting that so-called liberal
market economies in which earning inequalities and skill differentials have increased most
dramatically, such as the US and the UK, are profit-led, consistent with our model (Barbosa-
Filho and Taylor 2006). There is also evidence that advanced economies have become more
profit-led during the last decades of neoliberal policies (Onaram et al 2011; Carvalho and
Rezai 2016).
2.2 Role of education in the economy
Education plays a complex and multifaceted role in the economy, and we try to capture some
important aspects of it. First, education has a direct role in determining the dynamics of
the stock of human capital and knowledge by transforming L-workers into H-workers. The
main difference between the two types, in terms of their functions in the economy, is that
L-workers are simply an input into the production of the final good, while H-workers have
a more complex role. They also serve as a – distinct – input in the production of the final
good. In addition, and more importantly, H-workers have a number of other functions: they
increase the efficiency of both L- and H-workers through the process of innovation, and they
also help in the process of education, as mentors or educators. While L-workers tend to be
employed in routine production activities, H-workers are innovators. Unger (2007, pp.96-97),
who distinguishes such roles in terms of ideas about the mind, expresses it as follows:
We know how to repeat some of our activities, and we do not know how to
repeat others. As soon as we learn how to repeat an activity we can express
our insight in a formula and embody the formula in a machine ... The not
yet repeatable part of our activities – the part for which we lack formulas and
12
therefore also machines – is the realm of innovation, the front line of production.
In this realm, production and discovery become much the same thing.
We therefore assume that education converts workers who could only do repetitive tasks into
discoverers and innovators, although they continue to be engaged in some routine production
activities that are, however, qualitatively different from those of L-workers.
This formulation of the role of education can be found in the writings of classical
economists, including Smith (1776, p.282) and McCulloch (1825, p.122). McCulloch, in
fact, emphasized – much more than his contemporaries – the role of education and the dif-
fusion of knowledge in increasing growth through technological change (see O’Brien 1975,
p.217).14 It is now also fairly common in neoclassical growth theory, which stresses that
education and the accumulation of human capital increase productivity growth. However,
there are differences between the neoclassical approach and ours.
The standard view in neoclassical growth models with education is that there is no essen-
tial difference between workers who are educated and those who are not (e.g., Uzawa 1965;
Lucas 1988). Unskilled labor accumulates human capital through education and becomes
skilled labor, with a higher productive power. One worker becomes more than a worker in
efficiency units. In this approach, workers are qualitatively the same, and can be shifted
between the educational system and actual goods production. This is in contrast to our
model, in which education converts L-workers into H-workers who are qualitatively different.
Our approach is closer to the neoclassical trade-theoretic literature, which takes L- and
H-labor to be qualitatively different and distinct inputs. Models in this vein are used to
examine, for example, the implications of trade liberalization for the relative wages of skilled
and unskilled workers in developed countries (e.g., Stokey 1991; Wood 1994).
14See O’Donnell (1985) for a review of classical ideas on education.
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In our model, however, in addition to being qualitatively different inputs used in pro-
duction, H- and L-workers also have different roles in the economy. In this respect our
approach shares some characteristics with some other models with different types of labor.
Galor and Zeira (1993), for example, consider two types of technologies, one which uses
capital and skilled workers and the other which uses no capital and unskilled labor; thus
skills enable workers to work with capital while unskilled workers cannot do so. In other
models the roles are different because H-workers produce differentiated intermediate goods,
whereas L-workers only “assemble” the intermediate goods to produce the final good (see
Dutt 2005). We combine the two approaches, allowing both L- and H-workers to be inputs
into the production of the final good, but also allowing only H-workers to have a role in
inducing productivity growth and in the process of education.
The economic relevance of education, however, does not reduce to its influence on the
dynamics of human capital and technological progress. Authors working in the classical and
Marxian tradition have long emphasized the multidimensional role of education in influencing
the growth and distributive outcomes of capitalist economies. This literature incorporates
broad issues such as the role of education in determining social outcomes as the product of
conflict and/or cooperation. On the one hand, Marxist and radical scholars have emphasized
the role of education in weakening the position of workers by dividing them into groups based
on their level of education, in creating and strengthening the perception of upward socio-
economic mobility and thereby increasing tolerance for income inequality, indoctrination and
socialization, and easing the process of the extraction of effort (and hence labor productivity
and profits) (see, among many others, Giddens 1973; Bowles and Gintis 1975, 1976).
On the other hand, some classical economists viewed education in a more positive light.
Education, McCulloch (1825, p.134) believed, would show workers “how closely their inter-
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ests are identified with those of their employers, and with the preservation of tranquility and
good order”. Smith (1776, p.782) argued that education could play a key role in creating a
more informed and discerning polity by contrasting the tendency of the increasing division
of labor to make workers “as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to
become”. Even Marx (1867, p.453) saw education as “the only method of producing fully
developed human beings”, although he was thinking not of education in the form actually
existing in his time but of an ideal system, arguably in a classless society.
In section 5 we explore some of these broader issues by endogenizing the bargaining
power of workers and analyzing the implications of different education systems on workers’
attitudes, norms, and beliefs.
2.3 Dynamics of education
In our approach the rate of change in the number of people educated depends positively
on the number of educators and mentors; on the wage of H-workers relative to that of L-
workers; and on the broad institutional and organizational characteristics of the education
system, and in particular the access to education which captures factors such as the degree
of openness of the education system and the availability of educational loans.
By assuming that the wage differential affects the dynamics of the stock of H-workers, our
model is consistent with standard approaches emphasizing the relevance of individual pref-
erences (reflected, for instance, in their rate of time preference) and the returns to schooling
in the accumulation of human capital. However, it stresses other factors, such as the degree
of access to education, capturing the relevance of institutions and norms. Our approach is
therefore less specific than the standard one, but we consider this lack of specificity to be a
virtue because it opens up space for other, oft-neglected determinants of education.
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3 The benchmark model
In this section we set out the basic classical model with two kinds of labor, high- and low-
skilled, the quantities employed of which are H and L, and which receive real wages wH and
wL. We use the symbol HP to distinguish between H-workers employed in production from
those employed as educators, denoted by HE. The ratio of skilled to unskilled wage, the
skill premium, is
σ = wH/wL. (1)
With capital, we therefore have three inputs in the economy, which correspond to three
classes in society: capitalists who own physical capital, H-workers each with one unit of H-
labor and L-workers each with one unit of L-labor. We examine a closed economy in which
the government taxes to finance education but has no other fiscal functions.
Technology is as follows. There is only one sector producing one good which can be used
both for consumption and for (capital) investment. Production uses fixed coefficients input-
output relations with capital and a mixture of H- and L-labor as inputs into production.
The productivity of H- and L-labor is given at a point in time by AH and AL, respectively,
and the maximum output that can be produced by a unit of capital is k. To be specific, the
production function of the standard firm is:
Y = min{kK, f(ALL,AHHP )}, (2)
where Y is the output of the good, K is the amount of capital, and f is homogeneous of
degree one, which is consistent with the fixed coefficients structure. This function is in
16
line with standard classical assumptions in rejecting the substitutability between labor and
capital, but in principle it allows for substitutability between the two types of labor. In
the rest of this paper, for the sake of analytical convenience, and without significant loss of
generality, we assume a CES specification for the f function.
Assumption 1 (A1). Y = min{kK, [(ALL)ρ + (AHHP )ρ]
1
ρ}, with ρ < 0.
The CES structure is very general and is widely used in the literature on skill differentials
and human capital (see Autor et al. 1998; Acemoglu 2002a, 2002b). We assume limited
substitutability between the two types of labor. Although the received view is that ρ > 0,
recent empirical studies raise doubts on this finding and suggest that elasticity of substitution
is below one (Card et al. 1999; Skott and Slonimczyk 2012), a view which we believe to be
more plausible. Further, a negative value of ρ makes the analytical results starker and avoids
some unnecessary technicalities. However all of the main conclusions of the paper continue
to hold if ρ < 0.5, which encompasses the standard estimates of the elasticity of substitution.
Next, we assume that H-workers are more productive at all t, and that their productivity
advantage remains constant over time. Formally:
Assumption 2 (A2). There is a scalar µ ≥ 1, such that AH = µAL, all t.
This assumption encompasses the special case with µ = 1, at all t, and allows one to analyze
the effect of increases in productivity differentials on growth, distribution, and the relative
composition of the labor force. The assumption that µ is constant should be taken as an
approximation and a first step to a more complete analysis. Yet, this seems reasonable (if
not necessary) in a steady state, such that if any loss of generality occurs, this only has to
do with the analysis of the transition path.
Given A1 and A2, the optimal demands for H- and L-labor by profit-maximizing, perfectly
17




















































. Given A1, it follows that b′ < 0 and c′ > 0, where a
prime symbol indicates a derivative. Further, as σ tends to zero, b(σ) tends to infinity and
as σ tends to infinity, b(σ) tends to k/µ, and the function b(σ) is inelastic for all σ. The
function b(σ) is shown in Figure 1.
There exists a public sector responsible for delivering educational services. The govern-
ment is assumed to employ a fraction ε ∈ [0, 1) of the total supply of H-workers, HS, which
is given at a point in time, and pay them the wage for H-workers, wH . The rest of the
H-workers are available for employment in the private market.
The markets for the two kinds of workers are as follows. L-workers are in unlimited supply,
and along standard classical-Marxian lines we assume that their real wage is determined by
their relative bargaining power vis-à-vis firms (see, e.g., Goodwin 1967; Marglin 1984; Dutt
1990; Foley and Michl 1999; Duménil and Lévy 2003).16 We parameterize this state in terms
of the real wage of L-workers relative to their efficiency factor, AL, so that given bargaining
15The full derivation of the labor demand functions can be found in the online Addendum.
16The assumption of an unlimited supply of L-workers, or equivalently, of a sufficiently high growth rate
of the labor supply, allows us to ignore all labor constraints in the analysis of the long-run equilibria below.
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conditions, an increase in AL results in a proportionate increase in wL.
The market for H-workers is flexprice, and the skill premium adjusts in response to the
excess demand for H-workers, given the supply of these workers, denoted as (1− ε)Hs, and
given wL. The L-worker wage serves as a reference point, and given the skill premium, a
high wL increases wH proportionately. Formally:
Assumption 3 (A3). There exists a given positive scalar, λ, such that wL = λAL. Further,
given Hs, at any t, σ solves (1− ε)Hs = b(σ)K/AL.
Given the assumptions on the labor market, in what follows we use the symbols H and L, to
denote the quantities of H- and L-workers employed in production or education. The level
of λ is determined by the relative bargaining power of L-workers.
Consistent with Kaldor’s (1961) famous observation, we assume that technical progress
increases the productivity of labor inputs but not of capital inputs. We formalize the re-
lationship between the use of H-labor and labor productivity by assuming that the growth
rate of the productivity of H-workers depends positively on the amount of H-labor in effi-
ciency units as a ratio of the capital stock (used as a scaling factor representing the size of
the productive economy). Without significant loss of generality, we adopt a simple linear
functional form, and denoting growth rates by overhats, we assume:17
Assumption 4 (A4). There exist two scalars τ 0 and τ 1 with τ 0 ≥ 0 and τ 1 > 0 such that




Several features of A4 are worth noting. First, since all firms are identical, AH can be thought
17It is important to stress that all of our results continue to hold under more general functional forms
and assuming weaker effects of knowledge on productivity.
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of as the average productivity of H-workers. Thus, although there may be externalities
involved, they are not required. Second, by A4, both H-workers in production and educators
contribute to technological change. This is consistent with our focus on higher education,
but if educators contribute to technological change only indirectly by educating L-workers,
we can make technological change depend on (1− ε)H, which will not change our results as
long as ε is constant. Third, A4 implies that technical change is not driven only by the level
of skills: a higher skill intensity of the economy, measured by the stock of (effective) H-labor
relative to the size of the productive economy, has a positive effect on innovation, a plausible
assumption. It is worth noting, however, that we use the capital stock as a scaling factor
mostly for technical reasons.18 Finally, A4 allows for the possibility of exogenous growth in
productivity, i.e. τ 0 > 0, as a matter of generality. However, all of our results continue to
hold in a pure endogenous growth framework with τ 0 = 0.
Because AH and AL are in general different, in principle equation (5) would not be
sufficient to describe the behavior of labor productivity over time. By A2, however, it
follows that ÂL = ÂH , all t, and we can write




In other words, as in Romer’s (1990) classic paper, we distinguish two types of knowledge:
skills acquired via education represent knowledge embodied in human capital, which is ri-
val and excludable. In contrast, we conceptualize innovations as non-rival, non-excludable
18Our results would remain unchanged if the amount of H-labor in efficiency units was normalized, for
example, using aggregate output. Further, A4 could be generalized to include capital accumulation – another
proxy for learning-by-doing processes – as a determinant of technical progress. This would significantly
increase the amount of technicalities but it would not alter the qualitative properties of the model.
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products of learning-by-doing processes and innovation activity by H-workers with an imme-
diate spillover to L-workers, or as H-workers developing new methods of production, or new
instructions for mixing together productive inputs, which also increase L-worker productiv-
ity.19 The improved technology can be immediately adopted by all firms without investing
in new equipment.
L-labor is converted into H-labor through the process of education as follows:




where θ > 0 is a scalar, g : R+ → R+ is convex and continuously differentiable, and there
exists a value σmin ≥ 1 such that g(σ) = 0 for all σ ≤ σmin and g is strictly increasing for
all σ > σmin.
Thus, the change in the stock of H-workers depends, first, on the demand for educa-
tion which, in turn, depends positively on the skill premium, which increases the ‘return’
to education. Second, it depends on the stock of educators.20 Non-educator H-workers can
19Similar specifications are adopted in the standard literature on education, innovation and economic
growth where technical change depends on the time spent in education (see, for example, the classic papers
by Uzawa 1965 and Lucas 1988). The main difference is that we assume that both educators and H-workers
contribute to technical change. Our analysis is also similar to that of Aghion and Howitt (1998) who assume
that the (expected) rate of arrival of innovations depends on the level of employment in the research and
development sector. Their model, however, does not take education into account.
20Because every agent is endowed with one unit of time, the equation of motion of human capital could
be equivalently interpreted as taking domain in the fraction of time the H-workers spend educating and
mentoring others, rather than the number of educators. However, the latter interpretation is more natural
given the existence of a public sector responsible for delivering educational services.
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also positively affect the change in the stock of H-workers by increasing the support for,
and access to, education (for instance, a higher stock implies a higher number added from
H-worker families), but we do not explicitly model this; it does not affect our results qual-
itatively. Third, it depends on a parameter, θ, which captures the broad institutional and
organizational characteristics of the education system, and in particular its degree of open-
ness, either through government policy or through the degree of exclusivity of the higher
education system and also, indirectly, the functioning of credit markets, in their role of fi-
nancing education.21 Easier access to low-cost public higher education and to student loans
and grants, a more open private higher education system which is less elitist on the basis
of class and income, and an improved basic education system for all workers which makes
L-workers better prepared for higher education would all increase θ.22
To be sure, many different factors determine the influence of the education system (and
more generally the transmission of knowledge in a society) on the creation of skills. We regard
the parameter θ as a parsimonious way of modeling such influences, and thus potentially the
role of public policy in the creation of skills. It can be seen as a black box, capturing the
multifaceted influence of education on the dynamics of human capital.
We do not want to unnecessarily restrict our analysis and, apart from some mild regularity
21The parameter θ may also be seen as capturing the productivity of each educator, where productivity
is interpreted in a broad sense to encompass the institutional and organizational characteristics of the
education system. Given our focus on education policies, however, we consider changes in θ due to changes
in the openness of the education system, rather than – for example – in educational technology per se. We
are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this alternative interpretation.
22We assume θ > 0 consistent with our focus on developed economies, but we could generalize the model
to allow the parameter θ to be zero or even negative. This would correspond to a backward economy, or to a
dysfunctional education system in which knowledge and skills are not transmitted, and the stock of human
capital is stationary or even decreasing.
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conditions, do not specify an explicit functional form for g. The only theoretical restriction
concerns the definition of σmin: A5 incorporates the intuition that no one seeks education if
the wage premium falls below a certain level. This seems rather reasonable at a theoretical
and empirical level.23
We make the following assumption about consumption and saving behavior.24
Assumption 6 (A6). Workers – both high- and low-skilled – do not save, but consume
their entire income; capitalists save a fixed fraction, s, of their profits.
The pre-tax income of profit recipients, or capitalists, is given by
Y C = Y − wLL− wH(1− ε)H.
We assume that the government finances its educational expenditure, devoted entirely to the
payment of wages of educators (abstracting from non-wage costs for simplicity), by taxing
profits. This is consistent with A6 and it is broadly in line with the historical analysis of
education in class-divided societies in Galor and Moav (2006). However, the assumption is
made mostly for simplicity and without loss of generality.25 Thus, if Tp denotes the aggregate
taxes on profits, the net income of capitalists is
23This assumption can also be related to Smith’s (1776, pp.118-19) explanation of the “difference between
the wages of skilled labour and those of common labour” and to Mill’s (1848, pp.386-7) analysis of the relation
between skills and wages.
24Given A6, becoming skilled does not allow workers to start saving and accumulating wealth. The
incentive to acquire skill derives from the higher wage, and thus the higher consumption standard, that one
can obtain relative to remaining unskilled, as captured by the parameter σmin in A5.
25The model could be extended to include taxes on wages although at the cost of a substantial increase
in technicalities.
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rK = Y C − Tp = Y − wLL− wH(1− ε)H − Tp,
where r is the profit rate net of taxes. We assume that the government keeps a balanced
budget, so that Tp = wHεH, and the latter expression can be written as
rK = Y C − wHεH = Y − wLL− wHH. (7)
Hence, total consumption expenditure is
C = (1− s)rK + wLL+ wHH. (8)
This implies that saving is given by the standard equation,26
S = srK. (9)
Finally, regarding investment, we have the following.
Assumption 7 (A7). Saving and investment, I, are identically equal.
Capitalists save in order to invest, so that saving and investment are always equal. This
version of Say’s law is a standard assumption of models in the classical tradition, as discussed
earlier. Equation (9) and A7 imply
I = srK. (10)
Further, there is no effective demand problem, so that, given the existence of unemployed
26Observe that since government revenues are used to pay educators, and given the balanced budget
assumption, profit taxation has no effect on aggregate consumption and savings.
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L-workers, we have
Y = kK. (11)
This macroeconomic condition justifies the microeconomic profit-maximizing decision made
by each firm to produce at full capacity, as noted earlier.
We examine the determinants of growth and distribution focusing on several different
variables. The growth rate of the economy can be conveniently measured by K̂, which is
equal to Ŷ . Since we do not track the overall supply of labor (which may be taken to be
growing at an exogenous rate), K̂ also proxies the growth rate of per capita output.
Distribution can be measured by the income shares of the three classes: λc(σ)/k for L-
workers, σλb(σ)/k(1− ε) for H-workers, and r/k for capitalists. The distribution of income








which is increasing in σ. Thus intra-workers inequalities can be equivalently analyzed either
in terms of ν or in terms of σ.
We also examine the well-being of H- and L-workers by focusing on the growth rates of
their wages, ŵH and ŵL. Further, given our assumptions on the supply of L-labor, we cannot
explicitly analyze the dynamics of the unemployment rate. Hence, we capture changes in
workers’ welfare by focusing directly on the growth rates of employment, Ĥ and L̂.
Another variable of interest is the skill composition of employed workers (a proxy of the
skill composition of the labor force), which is given by the ratio H/L = b(σ)/c(σ)(1 − ε),
which is strictly decreasing in σ.
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4 Education, growth and distribution with constant
bargaining conditions
We examine the dynamics of the economy by considering two runs, for now assuming that
λ, the distributional parameter, is exogenously given. In the short run, K, H and AL are
fixed, and the model solves for Y, L, σ, r and I from equations (3), (4), (7), (10), and (11).
The profit rate is given by














Figure 1: Determination of the skill premium in the short run.
Let h = ALH/K. The short-run equilibrium value of σ is found as shown in Figure 1:









By A1 σ(h) is strictly decreasing and strictly convex for all h ∈ (k/µ(1− ε),∞).
In the long run K, H and AL can change. Assuming away the depreciation of capital
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without loss of generality, the change in capital stock is given by
dK/dt = I, (14)
and changes in H and AL are governed by equations (6) and (5a).
We examine the time path of the economy in the long run by focusing on the state
variable h = ALH/K. Because the growth rate of h is given by
ĥ = ÂL + Ĥ − K̂, (15)
we can substitute from equations (5a), (6), (10) and (12) through (14), to obtain
ĥ = τ 0 + τ 1µh+ θεg(σ(h))− s [k − λc(σ(h))− σ(h)λh] . (16)
The economy is defined as being in long-run equilibrium when ĥ = 0. Proposition 1
proves the existence of multiple long-run equilibria.

















Then there are two long-run equilibria: E1 with σ1 > 1 and E2 with σ2 < 1. E1 is dynami-
cally stable, whereas E2 is dynamically unstable.
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Proof. By equation (16), it follows that
dĥ
dh













Therefore, by A1 as h → k/µ(1 − ε), and σ tends to infinity, then ĥ → ∞ and dĥ
dh
→ −∞,
whereas as h → ∞, and σ tends to zero, then ĥ → ∞ and dĥ
dh
→ τ 1µ. If the condition
in the antecedent of the proposition is true, this implies that at h = b(1) (1− ε)−1 =
kµ−1 [M + 1]−
1
ρ (1− ε)−1, ĥ < 0, and thus by continuity there are at least two points
h1 = b(σ1)(1 − ε)−1 and h2 = b(σ2)(1 − ε)−1, where h2 > h1, σ1 > 1 and σ2 < 1, such
that ĥ = 0. Furthermore, by A1 and A5, it follows that ĥ is strictly convex and so there
exist exactly two such points. Stability follows in the usual manner noting that ĥ > 0 for all
h < h1 and h > h2, whereas ĥ < 0 for all h1 < h < h2.
Although Proposition 1 identifies two equilibria, only one of them, E1, is economically
meaningful because it is dynamically stable and has a skill premium greater than one. There-
fore in what follows we focus on E1.
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Condition (KTB) is sufficient (but not necessary) for the existence of a long-run equilib-
rium and it depends on the conditions of capital accumulation (K), technical change (T) and
bargaining (B). It is more likely to hold the lower τ 0, τ 1, λ, and the higher s, k. If technical
progress is too strong, or if profits and capital accumulation are too slow, then the dynamics
of innovation may dominate and lead the economy onto an explosive path.28
27We note in passing that at E1, Kaldor’s (1961) celebrated stylized facts are verified: constant factor
shares, increasing labor productivity, and a positive rate of capital accumulation.
28Along this explosive path eventually H no longer increases, but h keeps increasing as technological
change occurs faster than capital accumulation. This kind of self-reinforcing dynamics of technological
innovation with a constant stock of education, however, is unlikely to occur in practice, and the τ function
28
Proposition 2 is the main result of this section. It analyzes the effect of education policies
on growth, employment, and distribution.29
Proposition 2 (Education, growth and distribution). Assume A1-A7. Suppose that
(KTB) holds and σ1 > σmin. At E1, an increase either in θ or in ε implies that in equilibrium
the income share of L-workers increases relative to that of H-workers, but so does the profit
share in national income. Furthermore, the skill composition of employed labor, the growth
rate of the economy, and the growth rate of technical progress all increase. Finally, there
exists a σ∗ > 0 such that if σ1 > σ
∗ then a sufficiently small increase either in θ or in ε
yields an increase in the growth rate of human capital and employment.
Proof. 1. Consider θ first. Because σ1 > σmin, by equation (16) it follows that an increase
in θ yields an upward shift of the ĥ schedule. Since (KTB) holds, then there exists a long
run equilibrium at σ′1 < σ1. The first part of the proposition then follows noting that
h,H/L, τ , K̂, and r are decreasing functions of σ.
To prove the second part note, first, that at any steady state we have ĥ = 0, which implies
Ĥ = K̂ − ÂL. For small perturbations around the equilibrium, we can therefore analyze the
is likely to flatten out, so that (provided τ0 is not too high) a stable equilibrium is attained.
29Proposition 2 holds under the assumption that σ1 > σmin. If σmin ≥ σ1 > 1, then A5 implies that the
change in θ has no effects on the economy, which is caught in a low-skill trap. Intuitively, if there are no
people who wish to get educated because the skill premium is too low, increasing access to education has no
effect. The existence of a low-skill trap is consistent with results in the standard growth literature, such as
Galor and Tsiddon (1997). (Observe, however, that by Proposition 2, the government can still foster growth
and reduce intra-workers inequalities by increasing the fraction of H-workers that it employs, ε. Yet, this
has no effect on the growth rate of human capital, which remains stationary.)
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By A1 as h→ k
µ(1−ε) , we have
d(K̂−ÂL)
dh
→∞ and as h→∞ d(K̂−ÂL)
dh
→ −τ 1µ, and provided
ε is not too large,
d2(K̂−ÂL)
dh2




> 0 and for all h > h∗,
d(K̂−ÂL)
dh
< 0. The desired result then follows noting
that at the new steady state the equilibrium change in Ĥ must be equal to the change in
K̂ − ÂL.
2. Consider next ε. The desired argument follows in a similar fashion noting that, for any
given h, an increase in ε yields an increase in σ(h) and c(σ(h)), which implies in turn an
upward shift in the ĥ schedule for all h.
The dynamics of the economy can be examined graphically. Figure 2 shows the growth
rates of the main variables, as functions of h, under condition (KTB). The first two terms
on the right hand side of equation (16) show the growth rate of labor productivity, AL,
which increases with h. The third term represents the growth rate of the number of skilled
workers, H: as h increases, this rate falls as the skill premium falls. The last term represents
the growth rate of the capital stock, K. An increase in h implies that the skill premium
falls, so that the rate of profit rises because total labor costs decrease. We add up the
rates of growth of AL and H to obtain the ÂL + Ĥ curve, which first decreases and then
eventually increases with h. The long-run equilibria are determined at h1 = b(σ1)(1 − ε)−1
and h2 = b(σ2)(1− ε)−1, where k/µ(1− ε) < h1 < hmin, and hmin = b(σmin)(1− ε)−1.
The long-run equilibrium h1 is stable: starting from h < h1, for instance, ÂL+Ĥ > K̂, so
that h increases till it reaches h1. The long-run equilibrium h2, instead, is unstable: if h > h2
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initially, h increases indefinitely, with physical and human capital growing very slowly, or
not at all, and the growth rate of technical change dominating the dynamics.
 
Figure 2: The long-run dynamics and equilibrium.
Focusing on the stable long-run equilibrium E1, an increase in the openness of the educa-
tion system – captured by an increase in θ – shifts the Ĥ and ÂL+Ĥ curves upwards, making
them steeper, at all values h such that k/µ(1 − ε) < h < hmin. The long-run equilibrium
growth rates of capital and labor productivity increase, as can be verified from figure 2.
Consider next the effects on distribution. The low-skilled income share, λc(σ)/k, de-
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creases because the number of L-workers employed is a positive function of σ, given the
bargaining parameter and the productivity of capital. The high-skilled income share is given
by σ(h)λh/k(1− ε). When θ increases, the long-run equilibrium level of h increases, but the
rise in h is proportionately less than the fall in σ, given the inelasticity of the b(.) function,
so that σ(h)h falls. Indeed, the overall wage share decreases and both the rate of profit and
the profit share, r/k, rise. Thus income is redistributed from workers to capitalists. This, of
course, is why capital accumulation is speeded up, as we saw earlier. However, intra-workers
inequalities decline as H-workers lose more than L-workers and their relative share falls.
The effects on workers’ welfare are also interesting. The growth rate of the real wage of
both types of workers rises with a higher rate of technological change. Further, note that
the growth rate of low-skilled employment is L̂ = ĉ(σ) + K̂ − ÂL. Since at a steady state
ĉ(σ) = 0, and Ĥ = K̂ − ÂL, then Ĥ = L̂, and so the growth rates of the two types of
labor coincide in long-run equilibrium. For low levels of h1 a small increase in θ causes a
rise in the growth rate of human capital and employment. So the positive direct effect on
the education system dominates the negative indirect effect via the decrease in the long run
wage differential. For high levels of h1, the opposite is true. Thus, for low h1 the condition
of L-workers, in terms of their real wage level and growth rate, and employment growth,
is unequivocally improved.30 H-workers, instead, lose out in the sense that the equilibrium
wage differential decreases. But they do gain from the increase in the steady state growth
rates of the high-skilled real wage and employment.
Although our main focus is on education, it is interesting to analyze the effect of an
increase in the productivity differential between H- and L-labor, µ, which captures the effect
30Another potential benefit for the low skilled derives directly from increased access to education leading
to a change of status, and of wage, even though this effect is difficult to quantify.
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of skill-biased technical change in our model.31 Such a change decreases the demand for both
types of labor at a given h, due to the limited substitutability between them, thus increasing
the profit rate (since firms maximize profits), shifting the K̂ curve upwards. The decrease
in the demand for H-labor lowers σ at a given h, decreasing Ĥ and shifting its curve down.
However, the increase in µ increases ÂL for a given h shifting its curve upwards. Although
the rate of capital accumulation must increase, overall the effects of skill-biased technical
change are, interestingly, unclear. If the effect on K̂ and Ĥ dominates, then skill-biased
technical change leads to an increase in the skill premium and intra-worker inequality, and
a decrease in the profit share. However, if technological change responds strongly to h, and
the effect on ÂL dominates, skill-biased technical change may lead to a reduction in the skill
premium, and an increase in the profit share, contrary to the received wisdom.
Given our focus on growth and distribution, a natural question to ask at this point would
concern the effect of a change in the workers’ bargaining power. However, the analysis of
a purely exogenous perturbation of the class struggle parameter, λ, is not very informative.
Given the relevance of education, the existence of two separate groups of workers with
potentially conflicting interests, and the endogenous determination of the skill composition
of labor, it is important to analyze the interplay of education and labor market conditions.
31We note in passing that a sufficiently small improvement in the conditions of technical change, (τ0, τ1),
has the same qualitative effects as an improvement in the openness of the educational system except that
the growth rate of human capital and employment definitely declines. Instead an increase in the capitalists’
savings rate, s, raises the skill premium leading to an increase in intra-workers inequality and a decrease in
the profit share. Therefore, interestingly, it has an ambiguous effect on the growth rate of the economy and
a negative effect on the growth rate of technical change.
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5 Education, growth and distribution with variable con-
ditions of class struggle
We have so far assumed a constant low wage-productivity ratio, λ, given by bargaining
conditions. This assumption may be questionable, given the strong evidence of short-term
fluctuations in income shares driven by distributive conflict (Barbosa-Filho and Taylor 2006;
Flaschel 2009). To examine the implications of changes in λ we assume that L-workers have
a target ratio between wages and productivity which they try to achieve by pushing up
their real wage, but they are not fully able to increase their real wage at the same rate as
productivity growth. Formally:
Assumption 8 (A8). The real wage of L-workers changes according to
ŵL = δ1(λ
∗ − λ) + δ2τ , (17)
where δ1 > 0, λ
∗ = λ∗(θ), δ2 = δ2(θ), 1 > δ2 > 0, and δ2(.), λ
∗(.) are differentiable functions.
The value λ∗ is the target ratio of L-workers, which may be interpreted as reflecting normative
considerations (e.g. criteria of ‘just pay’). The value δ2 reflects workers’ bargaining strength
and cohesion, and thus their ability to claw back the benefits of productivity increases.
Equation (17) can be interpreted as the reduced form of a more complex dynamic model
with bargaining and optimizing agents (see, for example, Tavani 2013), and its parameters
capture broad economic, social, and institutional factors affecting workers’ norms, attitudes,
and beliefs, and more generally bargaining conditions.32 Thus, we assume that both the
32Including, for example, labor market conditions, which are not modeled explicitly here, consistent with
A3 and the existence of an unlimited supply of L-labor.
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target ratio λ∗ and the parameter capturing worker’s bargaining power, δ2, are affected by
the educational system, as captured by the educational access parameter, θ.
This assumption is consistent with the burgeoning literature on the effect of norms,
beliefs, and ideology on macroeconomic performance and distributive conflict (e.g., Alesina
and Glaeser 2004; Bénabou and Tirole 2006; Galor and Moav 2006). There is ample evidence
of violations of the rational expectation hypothesis, with agents holding distorted, or a
priori unfounded, perceptions of economic facts and often engaging in costly dissonance-
reduction when faced with facts that contradict their views. Agents’ views and perceptions
influence their choices and actions, and thus macroeconomic outcomes, and may lead to
multiple equilibria in which beliefs and macroeconomic outcomes are self-sustaining. For
example, empirical evidence shows that “individual voters’ perceptions of the extent to which
people control their own fate are major determinants of their attitudes toward inequality and
redistribution” (Bénabou and Tirole 2006, p.702). The educational system clearly plays a
central role here in that it contributes to shape norms, attitudes, and beliefs.
Alesina and Glaeser (2004), for example, argue that the differences between what may be
called the American and the European varieties of capitalism are at least partly explained
by differences in norms and beliefs. They also argue that “American beliefs result from
indoctrination predominantly controlled by the wealthier classes, whereas European beliefs
result from indoctrination predominantly controlled by Marxist-influenced unions, teachers,
and politicians” (Bénabou and Tirole 2006, p.703). In their historical analysis of the role of
education and human capital in the development of capitalist economies, Galor and Moav
(2006) establish an even more direct connection between educational systems and the be-
havior of the working class. They argue that in all capitalist economies the establishment of
a public education system was originally “motivated by a variety of reasons such as religion,
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social control, moral conformity, socio-political stability, and military efficiency” (Galor and
Moav 2006, p.89), and was meant to inculcate values of punctuality, discipline, manners,
and diligence in the working classes.
A8 can thus be seen as a succinct way of capturing the relevance of education, and edu-
cational systems – surely, together with other social, cultural, and institutional factors, – in
shaping individual norms, attitudes, and beliefs, which in turn affect behavior in distributive
conflicts and, ultimately, distributive outcomes.
It may be objected that equation (17) concerns the dynamics of the low-skilled workers’
wage in relation to a measure of low-skilled labor productivity, but it is not clear why the
structure of the higher education system should affect the bargaining strength of workers
who do not actually access it. We believe that the effect permeates into the entire working
class, including those who do not actually make use of higher education. In particular, the
openness of higher education can be related to changes in the quality of basic education
which affects all workers, making L-workers academically more prepared thus increasing
their chances of admission to, and success in, higher education.
Perhaps more importantly, the bargaining power of L-workers arguably depends on the
cohesion of the working class as a whole and therefore also on the attitude of H-workers.
And H-workers have two possible avenues to improve their economic conditions, for their
salary depends both on the skill premium and on the L-workers’ wage which represents the
base wage of H-workers. The ‘individualistic’ avenue focuses on the skill premium which is
determined competitively in the labor market. However, they can also adopt a ‘collective’,
class-based strategy to improve their lot by supporting L-workers in the bargaining process.
The two avenues are not mutually exclusive and their salience for H-workers will depend on
a number of institutional, normative and even cultural factors, which are also affected by
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the education system.
In other words, education affects workers’ solidarity and the ability of workers of both
types to maintain their wages in line with productivity increases; and there are “externalities”
from the education of H-workers to L-workers.
While we assume that educational access influences λ∗ and δ2, we do not specify exactly
how it affects workers’ attitudes in bargaining and conflict in order to allow for fundamental
differences in the nature of educational systems, consistent with the literature discussed
earlier. Below, we consider two alternative scenarios.
A8 states that the growth rate of the real wage depends positively on the extent to which
the actual ratio λ falls short of the target, and on the growth of labor productivity, because
workers demand and receive at least part of the fruits of higher labor productivity.33 Since,
from the definition of λ we have
λ̂ = ŵL − τ , (18)
substituting equations (5a) and (17) into (18) we get
λ̂ = δ1(λ
∗ − λ)− (1− δ2)(τ 0 + τ 1µh). (19)
Thus, an increase in h, by increasing the rate of productivity growth, reduces the growth
rate of the wage-productivity ratio because workers are unable to increase their real wage to
capture the full gains from productivity growth. An increase in the wage-productivity ratio
reduces its rate of increase because workers are closer to their target.
Equations (16) and (19) form a dynamic system involving the two state variables h and
33These dynamics could be made to depend on inflationary dynamics of price and money wage changes,
but we abstract from these complications for simplicity. See, for instance, Dutt (1990) for a discussion.
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λ. Equation (19) implies that the λ̂ = 0 isocline is:
λ = λ∗ − 1− δ2
δ1
(τ 0 + τ 1µh). (20)
Consider the ĥ = 0 isocline. Consistent with the analysis in the previous section, we
assume that there exists some positive value of λ such that (KTB) holds. Formally:
τ 0 + τ 1k [M + 1]
− 1
ρ (1− ε)−1 < sk. (KTB0)
(KTB0) ensures the existence of a stationary value of h with positive real wages and a
skill premium greater than one if λ = 0. Then there exists a value of λ, denoted as λ,
that solves τ 0 +
τ1k











. By Proposition 1, we
know that for all λ ∈ [0, λ), there exist two values (h1, h2), with h1 < h = b(1)(1 − ε)−1 =
kµ−1 [M + 1]−
1
ρ (1− ε)−1 < h2, such that ĥ = 0, whereas if λ = λ, then h = h = b(1)(1−ε)−1




the ĥ = 0 isocline is first increasing and then decreasing in h.34 From equation (16) we see
that an increase in λ reduces the rate of profit and the rate of accumulation by increasing the
payments to both kinds of workers, and hence increases ĥ. At h1, the effect of h on physical
and human capital accumulation is stronger than the effect on technological change, and an
increase in h reduces ĥ, so that the ĥ = 0 isocline is positively sloped. At h2, the opposite
holds, and the ĥ = 0 isocline is negatively sloped.
Let λmax = λ∗ − 1−δ2
δ1





denote the intercepts of the λ̂ = 0
34Indeed, the argument in Proposition 1 can be generalized to prove the existence of λ̃ ≥ λ such that for
all λ ∈ [0, λ̃), there exist two equilibria (h1, h2) such that h1 < h2 and at h1 dĥdh < 0 whereas at h2,
dĥ
dh > 0.
It can also be proved that the downward sloping part of the ĥ = 0 isocline is concave in λ.
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isocline. Let h1(0) and h2(0) denote the two values of h, with 0 < h1(0) < h2(0), such that
ĥ = 0 when λ = 0: by Proposition 1 they exist, and h1(0) = b(σ1)(1− ε)−1 with σ1 > 1 and
h2(0) = b(σ2)(1− ε)−1, with σ2 < 1. By A5, h2(0) = (sk − τ 0)/τ 1µ.
Proposition 3 provides sufficient conditions for the existence of economically meaningful
long-run equilibria.
Proposition 3 (Long-run equilibria). Assume A1-A8. Suppose that (KTB0) holds and
0 < λmax < λ.
(i) If hmax ≥ h2(0), then there exist two long-run equilibria: E1 is stable with σ1 > 1 and E2
is unstable with σ2 < 1. At E1 the wage-productivity ratio is higher, and the stock of human
capital is lower than at E2.
(ii) If h1(0) ≤ hmax < h2(0), there exists a unique stable long-run equilibrium with σ1 > 1.
Proof. 1. Claim (i). Suppose that 0 < λmax < λ and hmax ≥ h2(0). The existence of
the two equilibria follows noting that given the monotonicity of the two isoclines and the
concavity of the downward sloping part of the ĥ = 0 isocline, the two curves intersect twice:
once in the increasing part of the ĥ = 0 isocline, at E1, and once in its decreasing part, at
E2. By Proposition 1, and the shape of the two isoclines, it follows that at E1 σ1 > 1, while
at E2 σ2 < 1, and so h1 < h2. Furthermore, since the λ̂ = 0 isocline is negatively sloped it
follows that λ1 > λ2.
2. In order to investigate the stability properties of the two equilibria consider the Jacobian
of the dynamic system dĥdh = τ 1µ+ εθg′(σ)σ′(h) + sλσ(h)
[





= s [c (σ(h)) + σ(h)h] > 0
dλ̂
dh







. Since the ĥ = 0 isocline is positively sloped at E1 and negatively
sloped at E2, the upper left entry is negative in the former case and positive in the lat-
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ter. Therefore in the neighborhood of E1 the Jacobian has a negative trace and a positive
determinant, satisfying the conditions for stability. In a neighborhood of E2, instead, the
determinant of the Jacobian is negative, so that the equilibrium is a saddle-point.
3. If h1(0) ≤ hmax < h2(0), then given the monotonicity of the two isoclines, they intersect
only once on the upward sloping part of the ĥ = 0 isocline, E1. As in step 1, it follows that
σ1 > 1. The stability of the long-run equilibrium E1 follows as in step 2.
Remark : Under (KTB0), there always exist combinations of the parameters such that the
conditions 0 < λmax < λ and either h1(0) ≤ hmax < h2(0) or hmax ≥ h2(0) can both hold.35
Figure 3 shows the long-run dynamics of this model.36 The long-run equilibria occur at
the intersections of the ĥ = 0 and λ̂ = 0 curves. The economically meaningful equilibrium
E1 is (asymptotically) stable, and the economy may converge directly or cyclically to it, as
can be seen from the arrows. The equilibrium E2 instead is unstable. The possibly cyclical
movement around E1 is quite interesting and consistent with classical models of growth with
distributive conflict such as Goodwin’s (1967) seminal contribution.
We may now analyze the effect of education in the economy. Consider first the ĥ = 0
isocline. Proposition 2 implies that an increase in θ shifts (a portion of) the upward sloping
part of the ĥ = 0 curve to the right, as shown by the dotted line, because it increases ĥ at
given values of h and λ, for all h such that σ = σ(h) > σmin.
The effect of an increase in θ on the λ̂ = 0 isocline depends on the nature of education and
on its effect on the workers’ bargaining position. If education facilitates the self-development
35Observe, however, that both λmax and hmax are monotonically increasing in λ∗, δ1, and δ2. Therefore,
if conditions in the labor market are particularly conflictive, it may happen that the λ̂ = 0 isocline lies
entirely above the ĥ = 0 isocline and no equilibrium exists.
36Figure 3 has been drawn assuming the ĥ = 0 isocline to be strictly concave. This is for the purposes of
illustration and none of the results depend on it.
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of individuals, making them more conscious of their rights and nature as social beings, and
increases workers’ solidarity, then the functions λ∗(θ) and δ2(θ) may be increasing in θ. In
this case, the λ̂ = 0 isocline tends to shift to the right and become flatter. The combined
effect on the two curves can be summarized in the next proposition.
	  
λ	  












Figure 3: Long-run dynamics and equilibria of the model with variable λ.
Proposition 4 (Progressive role of education). Assume A1-A8. Suppose that (KTB0)
holds. Suppose that 0 < λmax < λ, hmax ≥ h1(0), and λ∗(θ), δ2(θ) are increasing in θ. Then
at a long-run equilibrium with σ1 > σmin, a small increase in θ yields a decrease in intra-
worker inequality, whereas the skill composition of the labor force and the growth rate of
technological progress increase. Further, if education has a strong effect on workers’ values,
beliefs and expectations, their bargaining strength increases.
Proof. 1. By Proposition 3, there exists at least one long-run equilibrium with σ1 > 1.
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Suppose that σ1 > σmin. Consider the two isoclines
τ 0 + τ 1µh+ θεg(σ(h))− s [k − λc(σ(h))− σ(h)λh] = 0 (21)
δ1(λ
∗ − λ)− (1− δ2)(τ 0 + τ 1µh) = 0 (22)
Let W (h) = c(σ(h))+σ(h)h. By totally differentiating the latter expressions with respect
to h, λ and θ, we obtain
dĥ
dh





























the latter system of equations in matrix form:


















Let ∆ = dĥ
dh
− sW (h) (1−δ2)
δ1





















Therefore the effect of an increase in the openness of the education system on the two
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therefore noting that W (h) > 0, it follows that ∆ < 0.


















> 0. The effect on λ cannot be definitely signed but dλ
dθ






























the more likely the latter inequality will hold.
If, instead, education is important in inculcating an ideology of resignation and modera-
tion, in increasing the tolerance for inequality and creating the perception of greater upward
mobility than actually exists, or in undermining workers’ solidarity by emphasizing differ-
ences in educational attainment, then the functions λ∗(θ) and δ2(θ) may be decreasing in θ.
In this case, the λ̂ = 0 isocline will tend to shift to the left and to become steeper. Then:
Proposition 5 (Education as ideology). Assume A1-A8. Suppose that (KTB0) holds.
Suppose that 0 < λmax < λ, hmax > h1(0), and λ
∗(θ) and δ2(θ) are decreasing in θ. Then at
a long-run equilibrium with σ1 > σmin, a small increase in θ yields a decrease in workers’
bargaining strength. Further, if education has a strong effect on workers’ values, beliefs and
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expectations, the wage differential increases.
Proof. Equations (24)-(25) can be derived as in the proof of Proposition 4. Then, if


















< 0. The effect on h cannot be definitely signed but dh
dθ
< 0 if and only if the following
condition holds:



































the more likely the latter inequality will hold.
Thus, if education has a significant effect on workers’ attitudes and beliefs, more proac-
tive education policies have an impact on income distribution within the working class. If
education is progressive, workers’ bargaining power increases, wage differentials decrease (as
an effect of increased workers’ solidarity) and the steady state growth rates of H- and L-
workers’ real wages increase, thanks to the higher growth rate of technological progress. The
opposite holds if education deepens any cleavages within the working class.
Interestingly, however, the effect on the distribution of income between wages and profits
– and thus on growth – is not obvious, because the bargaining strength of the working class
as a whole and wage differences within the working class may move in opposite directions.
Proposition 6 Assume A1-A8. Suppose that (KTB0) holds. Suppose that 0 < λ
max < λ
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long-run equilibrium with σ1 > σmin, a small increase in θ yields an increase in the profit






τ 1µW (h)− λW ′(h)
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Proof. By Proposition 3, there is at least one long-run equilibrium with σ1 > 1. Suppose
that σ1 > σmin. Equations (24)-(25) can be derived as in the proof of Proposition 4.
For given s and k, the profit rate, the profit share and the growth rate of the economy
increase in equilibrium if and only if total labor costs λW (h) decrease:
dλ
dθ

















W (h)− λW ′(h) 1
∆
{









sλW ′(h) and ∆ < 0.
By Proposition 6, it follows that if education has limited effects on workers’ attitudes,
norms and beliefs (conditions (26) and (27) do not hold), then an increase in the openness
of the education system fosters profitability and growth. If, instead, education has a strong
effect on workers’ values, beliefs and expectations the effect of an increase in education
is less clear cut. For example, if education is progressive, the skill differential and intra-
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workers inequalities decrease, which tends to reduce the share of wages in national income.
If education has a strong effect in influencing workers’ attitudes, this may be compensated by
an increase in workers’ bargaining power, which increases the wages of both types of workers.
The overall effect on the profit rate and the profit share depends on the relative strength of
the two effects as captured in condition (28).37
6 Back to the stylized facts
The previous analysis shows that a classical approach produces some interesting and novel
insights on the economic role of education. It may be objected, however, that the full model
does not allow us to derive definite conclusions on the effects of education on growth and
distribution, which depend on the characteristics of the educational system and on other
social and institutional factors. We see this apparent indeterminacy as an advantage of our
model. Theoretically, it is inappropriate to analyze the effects of “education” as if it was
an objectively defined, neutral notion and abstracting completely from its interaction with
the broader structure of the labor market and employment relations. Empirically, noting
the major international differences in educational systems, labor market institutions, and
so on, our approach allows one to formulate testable claims that are appropriate for given
37The effect on the growth rates of human capital and employment is also ambiguous. The effect of an
increase in education on the growth rate of human capital is given by dĤdθ = εg(σ(h)) + εθg
′(σ(h))σ′(h)dhdθ .
Therefore, using equation (24), an increase in θ increases the growth rate of human capital – and employment




εg(σ(h)) + sW (h)dBdθ
]
. This inequality always holds if education
is regressive and it has a strong effect on workers’ norms and beliefs (so that condition (27) holds and
the expression in square brackets is negative). If, however, condition (27) does not hold, or education is
progressive, then a more open education system speeds up the accumulation of human capital only if the
direct effect of the increase in θ more than compensates the indirect effect via a decrease in the skill premium.
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countries. Our analysis, for example, highlights an interesting causal mechanism that may
contribute to explain some of the stylized facts of the US economy since 1975.
To use our analysis to understand the trends in growth and income distribution we note
that while in quantitative terms education has expanded, the nature of education in the
US (and other countries) has changed over the past few decades. Although changes in
the nature of education are difficult to demonstrate with hard data, qualitative judgements
made by observers of education systems from a variety of perspectives, as well as some broad
quantitative indicators, are revealing and suggest that education has taken an increasingly
regressive character.
The class-based nature of schooling in the US has long been highlighted by radical and
Marxian scholars, who have criticized both the type of education provided and its unequal-
izing effect due to the differential treatment of students from different classes (in addition
to the different use students can make of educational opportunities because of family cir-
cumstances, something that has been discussed more widely). In their seminal work, for
example, Bowles and Gintis (1975, 1976) have shown that schools, colleges and universities
socialize “students to accept beliefs, values and forms of behavior on the basis of authority,
rather than the students’ own critical judgments of their interests” (Bowles and Gintis 2002,
p.12). They have also examined how these qualities can be traced to a variety of factors, in-
cluding the role of the capitalist class in influencing the formation and growth of educational
institutions and their curricula. Baran and Sweezy (1966, pp.333-4) have discussed how high
schools in the US differentiate between the “academically talented” and others. They cite
the view of Harvard University President James Conant who, after a comprehensive inquiry
into the educational system felt that the former, who comprised between 15 to 20 percent
of all high-school students, “should be given a break: they should be more challenged, their
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program of academic subjects should be intensified and broadened.” To the remaining 80
to 85 per cent, Conant’s approach is quite different. His prescription for the plebs is “mean-
ingful sequences of courses leading to the development of marketable skills ... and while the
students enrolled should also get some instruction in English, social studies and the like, no
undue stress is to be placed in their curricula on academic subjects”.
From a liberal perspective, Nussbaum (2010), drawing on the experiences of the US
and other countries, points out that “[r]adical changes are occurring in what democracies
teach the young ... Thirsty for national profit, nations, and their systems of education, are
heedlessly discarding skills that are needed to keep democracies alive. If this trend continues,
nations all over the world will soon be producing generations of useful machines, rather
than complete citizens who can think for themselves, criticize tradition, and understand the
significance of another person’s sufferings and achievements” (Nussbaum 2010, p.2). She
continues that “[t]he student’s freedom of mind is dangerous if what is wanted is a group
of technically trained obedient workers to carry out the plans of elites who are aiming at
foreign investment and technological development” (Nussbaum 2010, p.21).
A shift in student interest towards career goals and financial rewards is discernable from
the available data, although the extent to which the education system contributes to this
or results from it is difficult to determine. According to the US Department of Education’s
Higher Education General Information Survey, the share of undergraduate business majors in
total undergraduate degrees awarded increased from 13.7 per cent in 1970-71 to 22.8 per cent
in 1990-91 and has remained more or less in the low 20s since then. The American Freshman
Survey, which has collected data from 1967, shows that for entering first year students in the
US, when asked about “objectives considered to be essential or very important” the percent
who checked “developing a meaningful philosophy of life” fell from 87 in 1967 to 45, and
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those who checked “being very well off financially” increased from 40 to 82. It is arguable
that these trends in the nature of the education system can explain – at least in part –
the incorrect perceptions about the extent of inequality especially in the US. For instance,
Norton and Ariely (2011) show that US survey respondents believed that agents in the top
quintile of the wealth distribution in the US owned 59 per cent of all the wealth and those
in the bottom 40 per cent owned 10 per cent, while the top 20 per cent actually owned 84
per cent and the bottom 40 owned 0.3 per cent.
All this may contribute to explain why the remarkable expansion in education occurred
in the last four decades has not produced the expected growth-inducing and inequality-
reducing effects suggested by our basic model, and predicted by neoclassical macro models.
Our hypothesis is that after the collapse of the Keynesian compromise, there has been a
breakdown in collective organization and worker solidarity (forcefully shown in the decrease
in unionization rates) which has been caused by a number of economic, institutional and
cultural factors.38 The educational system has played an important role in this trend by
taking up an increasingly regressive and ideological character. The breakdown in workers’
solidarity has led to an increase in intra-workers inequalities, which have more than offset the
decrease in skill differential due to the increase in supply of H-workers.39 The combined effect
38Of course, technological change may also have played an important role in the weakening of workers’
bargaining position, as suggested, for example, by Acemoglu et al (2001).
39It may be argued that while much of the wage inequality in the US in the last four decades is attributable
to the upper-tail (e.g. 90/50 ratio) inequality, the labor market institutions analyzed in the paper are capable
of explaining the minimum-wage struggles by unions which can only account for lower-tail inequality. This
is far from obvious and recent empirical work suggests that labor market institutions have a significant
impact on the whole distribution. Jaumotte and Osorio Buitron (2015), for example, “find evidence that
the erosion of labor market institutions is associated with the rise of income inequality in our sample of
advanced economies, notably at the top of the income distribution.”
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of the decrease in workers’ overall bargaining power and the increase in skill differential has
been a relatively stable profit share over the period, which in turn explains (in a profit-led
economy such as the US) the relatively flat trend in the economy’s growth rate.
It is important to stress that our model is not meant to provide a comprehensive expla-
nation of recent empirical trends, and we are not suggesting that the expansion in higher
education has caused the increase in inequality and the relatively sluggish growth in the US
in the last four decades. The main purpose of our analysis is to provide a counterpoint to
the standard emphasis on the beneficial effects of education. For granting that education has
taken up an increasingly regressive and ideological character, Proposition 5 does suggest that
an increase in education may have contributed – surely, together with many other political,
institutional and even cultural factors – to a decrease in workers’ bargaining power with the
breakdown of workers’ solidarity. Education creates skills, but it does many other things
too, and education policies should be evaluated taking into account both the actual content
of the education provided and the broader political and institutional framework.
7 Conclusion
This paper has developed a classical model to examine the growth and distributional con-
sequences of education. In the model, an expansion of education allows more L-workers to
become H-workers and, in terms of broader political economy considerations, it can affect
bargaining conditions. From a theoretical viewpoint, this paper has thus attempted to fill
a lacuna in the literature on the classical approach, which has neglected the formal analysis
of the effects of education and skill formation on distribution and growth, an issue which
seems a key feature of contemporary knowledge-based capitalist economies.
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The model suggests that in a profit led, class-divided, economy with significant unemploy-
ment, an increase in education may have a positive effect on growth (and on intra-workers
inequalities). Yet, unlike in standard growth models this is not due to an improvement in
labor productivity but to a worsening distribution between workers and capitalists. Edu-
cation policies may lead to an increase in the profit share, and in the growth rate, either
because an increase in the stock of educated workers lowers the reward to skills (provided
that substitutability between two types of workers is not too high), or because education
policies can affect workers’ norms and beliefs, and thus indirectly their bargaining position.
Our model analyzes how the expansion of education affects the distribution of income
between three classes, that is, capitalists, H-workers and L-workers. The expansion of educa-
tion has the short-run effect of reducing the skill premium and this increases the profit share,
given the workers’ bargaining power. When we allow the state of class struggle to change
endogenously, the distributional effects of an expansion of education depend on the nature of
the education system. A progressive education tends to increase workers’ bargaining power
and solidarity, and to reduce intra-class inequalities. The opposite holds if education plays
an ideological role of socializing people into accepting large inequalities. Interestingly, how-
ever, the effect of education on inter -class inequalities cannot be determined a priori: the
movement of the profit share depends on the relative strength of the various effects.
In other words, contrary to the received wisdom, in profit-led economies characterized by
labor unemployment and wage bargaining, education and human capital accumulation do
not yield unambiguously positive effects on distribution. In the presence of several departures
from the abstract model with perfectly competitive markets, optimizing agents, and smooth
substitutability between inputs of production, more complex and encompassing measures
(e.g., improving education access and undertaking proactive policies to increase employment)
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are necessary to obtain equitable growth outcomes.
The model developed here is simple and various assumptions can be relaxed. Concerning
the structure of the economy, it would be interesting to drop the assumption that savings are
automatically invested, thus allowing aggregate demand issues to enter into the distribution
of output and growth. Further, it would be worth exploring explicitly the implications of
demographic factors and of labor supply decisions. Among other things, this would allow
us to analyze more explicitly the effect of labor market conditions on workers’ bargaining
strength in the general model.
Concerning the role of education and its influence on class cleavages, several extensions
seem particularly interesting: allowing H-workers to save and hold capital, and thereby have
mixed class interests (this case is examined in Dutt and Veneziani (in press) in a special
case of the economy considered here); allowing the wage premium to change slowly with the
possibility that some H-workers find low-skilled jobs (being chosen above L-workers); and
introducing different levels of education (such as primary, secondary, and higher education).40
These extensions might provide some insights on broader questions regarding the role of
education in distributive struggles and in determining the income and wealth distribution.
Will the spread of education blur the distinction between workers and capitalists by allowing
workers to become capitalists (with human capital)? Or will the classical distinction between
workers and capitalists continue to have a central role to play? We leave these issues for
further research.
40See, for example, Nakajima and Nakamura (2012).
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A Addendum (not for publication, to be posted on-
line)
A.1 The derivation of the labor demand functions
In this section, for notational simplicity, we shall use H instead of HP to denote the amount














Λ (L,H, λ) = wLL+ wHH + λ[Y
ρ − (ALL)ρ + (AHH)ρ].
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Then, equation (32) can be written as









































































Equations (3) and (4) follow by substituting σ = (wH/wL).
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